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Abstract. This article uses a new data structure namely System Flow
Graph (SFG) that offers a compact representation of information dis-
semination induced by an execution of an application to characterize
malicious application behavior and lead some experiments on 4 malware
families DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2, jSMSHider, BadNews. We show
how SFG are relevant to exhibit malware behavior.
1 Introduction
Android is an operating system dedicated to mobile devices. Due to its widespread
adoption and the sensitive nature of data such devices may contain, Android be-
came the target of malicious applications. As pointed out in different studies [1,
2], Android security mechanism is not efficient enough to perfectly protect users
and sensitive data on their device from malware. Security groups have thus
worked on security extensions for Android to improve its security level.
Monitoring applications to detect misbehaviours appears to us as a promis-
ing idea but we also believe that the analysis should not be restricted to the
application itself but to its impact, direct or not, on the entire system. Indeed,
traditional approaches limit themselves to the application itself and its direct in-
teraction with its environment [3–6]. By doing so, some useful information about
the action of the application may remain unnoticed. For instance, monitoring
only a running sample of DroidKungFu1[7] and its child processes on Android,
does not allow to observe that once it drops one of its payload in /system/app,
the content of the payload is automatically used by two main system processes
and propagated to other files in the system.
To overcome this shortcoming of traditional profiles, we choose to monitor
information flows caused by an application in the whole system. Therefore we
propose to define an application profile as a representation of how the application
disseminates its data in the whole system and how these pieces of data are
processed by the other applications. For that purpose, we use a data structure
previously introduced in [8]. This data structure, called System Flow Graph
(SFG), represents how an application disseminates its own pieces of data in
an operating system during an execution. In this article we present how this
structure helps to understand and classify malware.
As stated in [9], malware authors are used to repackage applications with
their malicious code and submit these repackaged applications on distribution
platforms to infect users. These repackaged applications represent 86% of the
malware samples in Android genome project according to the same source. As
a malware author infects different applications with the same malicious code,
these applications share a common behaviour and consequently we claim that
they should share a common sub-SFG. This will be able to cope even with
code that is obfuscated or ciphered. In the following we present related works in
application analysis and tainting techniques for malware detection (section 2).
Then, we present the underlying model of the information flow monitor we choose
to use and a compact format to describe information flows (section 3). We then
explain how a SFG is used to build a malware signature based on its behavior
(section 4) and experiment our proposition (section 5).
2 Related works
Tainting consists in marking pieces of information to monitor how they are dis-
seminated in a program or in a system. They have been used to analyse how
applications access sensitive data and how they process it. In [10], Yin et al.
proposed to monitor information flow at hardware level to detect if suspicious
applications accessed sensitive data and how they processed it. In subsequent
work [11], Yin et al. used a similar approach and presented DroidScope, an An-
droid analysis environment. Like Panorama, DroidScope monitors information
flow at hardware level and aimed at detecting if a monitored application accesses
to data considered as sensitive, when it is the case the application is considered
as malicious. Tainting techniques have also been used on real devices to iden-
tify Android applications that leak confidential data. In [1], Enck et al. present
TaintDroid, a modified version of Android that monitors information flow at
application level. They selected pieces of sensitive data (e.g: IMEI and location
data) that should be considered as confidential and monitored how they spread
thanks to tainting techniques. When an application accesses a piece of tainted
data, TaintDroid considers that the piece of data is flowing and propagates the
corresponding taint to the destination container. In TaintDroid, destination con-
tainers that can be tainted are Java application variables, IPC messages and files.
TaintDroid raises an alert whenever a piece of tainted data leaves the device.
Their study showed that more than a third of thirty popular applications are
responsible of sensitive data leakage to remote entities. If TaintDroid detects
information leaks, it does not however give enough information to diagnose how
the leaks happened. Furthermore, it only monitors information flow at Java ap-
plication level: information flows involving native applications are not detected
by TaintDroid because they do not run inside the Dalvik virtual machine which
has been modified to monitor information flow.
As tainting techniques permit to understand how pieces of sensitive data are
used, they give a better insight about the intent of an application compared to its
use of functions. We therefore claim that such techniques are a better candidate
to classify and detect pieces of malware. Unlike the approach used in DroidScope,
Panorama and TaintDroid in which their authors focus on information they
consider as sensitive, we think that the classification and detection should first be
focused on the pieces of data owned by the application under analysis. To classify
malware samples and detect their execution, we mark their origin container, apk
file on Android and monitor how its content is disseminated in the system. From
this dissemination profile, we regroup samples that propagate their own data in
the same way and use this profile to detect execution of samples from the same
malware family.
3 Capturing external behaviours of applications
In this work, we use Blare1 [12], an intrusion detection system, to monitor in-
formation flows at system level. Blare is aware of information flows occurring
between files, processes and sockets. Blare implementation relies on the Linux
Security Module framework [13] that introduces hooks in the kernel to intercept
syscalls. Blare uses these hooks to intercept syscalls that induce information flow
between system objects and maintains tags on these objects. In particular, Blare
maintains a tag called itag on each container of information at system level. This
tag permits to know if a container has been contaminated by a marked piece
of data. Besides intercepting syscalls, Blare also performs a finer monitoring of
information flows occurring through the binder driver on Android. When Blare
observes an interaction between system objects, it computes the corresponding
information flow and performs the appropriate tag update. For example, when a
process P reads a file F , it performs a read syscall. Blare intercepts this syscall
and deduces that information flows from F to P . It then updates the tag asso-
ciated to P to take into account its new content. If the file is later read by an
other process then this process will have an itag indicating that its content has
also been contaminated. In general, Blare updates the value of the itag attached
to an object each time it considers that the content of this object has been
changed. In this work, we use Blare to keep under surveillance a newly installed
application that we do not trust. We assign a unique identifier i to informa-
tion originating from the application and monitor how the pieces of information
identified with i are disseminated in the whole system. Technically speaking this
is done by assigning tiu as the itag value of the apk file of the application we
want to monitor. The apk file is the archive containing all the code and resources
of Android applications. As we only focus on information from the application
that we do not trust, there is no other identifier used in the system and the only
possible values of itag are therefore H and tiu. During an execution, if container
c has an itag value equal to H, it means that c has not been contaminated by
the marked application. Otherwise it means that the content of c may have been
contaminated by the application. Each time Blare observes an information flow
involving a content associated to an non-null itag, it adds an entry in its log
to describe the observed flow. Each log entry describes the source container of
1 http://blare-ids.org/
the flow, its destination and the information identifiers associated to the pieces
of information that are propagating. It also contains a timestamp correspond-
ing to the moment at which the flow was observed. Source and destination are
described by their type, their name and their system identifier.
A log produced by Blare when monitoring an application exactly depicts
how pieces of data owned by this application are disseminated within the sys-
tem. However, the longer the monitoring of an application lasts, the bigger its
log size grows. Some of the log entries may be repeated: for instance when a
process reads a huge file it will repeat several times the same read syscall. We
then propose in a data structure named System Flow Graph to compact the
representation of a Blare log. A System Flow Graph (SFG) [8] describes how
pieces of information are disseminated within the system during one execution.
A SFG is a graph representation of a Blare log without information loss. A SFG
has a more compact form. It is thus more readable than a log. Formally, a SFG
is a labelled directed graph G “ pV,Eq. Each node v P V represents a container
of information and each edge e P E from a node v1 to a node v2 an informa-
tion flow from v1 to v2. Each node has three attributes: its system id, its name
and its type (process, file or sockets). These three attributes are respectively
denoted v.id,v.name and v.type. An edge has two attributes identified as e.flow
and e.timestamp. e.flow is a collection of information identifiers involved in the
flow corresponding to e. The attribute e.timestamp is a list of timestamps at
which Blare observed the flow corresponding to e. SFG construction relies on
the Blare log. We have a tool that transforms a log into an SFG.
4 System Flow Graph as behaviour-based signatures
As malware authors are used to repackage original applications with their mali-
cious code, applications infected with the same malicious code exhibit a common
behaviour. Their corresponding SFGs therefore share a common sub-SFG that
represents this common behaviour. We propose to use this common sub-SFG as
a malware signature and explain below how to compute it.
A SFG describes how a piece of data disseminates in the whole system. In this
study we propose to monitor how data originating from an application archive
(apk file) is processed and thus how an application contaminates the operating
system. To obtain the corresponding SFG we mark the apk file of the application
right after it is installed on the device. Once the archive marked, the application
is launched and monitored by Blare.
In the following we present a core algorithm used to classify a set of SFG
into different subsets where each subset share a common sub-SFG that is the
signature of the subset. The main algorithm is a classifier computing a fixed-point
on the call of the function named one-step-classification on a classification
list. A classification list is a list that associates a signature with all the SFGs
that include this signature. A signature is a sub-SFG that appears at least in two
SFGs given in input. This way, if the SFG list given as input contains at least
two samples of the same malware family, our algorithm will output a signature.
More precisely, the main algorithm takes as input a list [g1, ...,gn] of
SFG and white a white list of SFG. First it stores in a variable named assoc a
classification list initially set to [(g1, [g1]), . . . ,(gn, [gn])]. The main part is then a
loop that computes a fix point of one-step-classification(assoc, white).
The function one-step-classification is described in algorithm 1. In short,
it computes the biggest common part of a list of SFGs deprived of all part that
also appear in SFGs of benign applications characterized by the SFG list white.
When a fixed point is finally reached, the main algorithm will output a classi-
fication list of the form [(s0, [g01, ...,g0i]), ...,(sm,[gm1, ...,gmk])]
where s0, s1 . . . sm are the resulting signatures and [gl1 , . . . ,gli ] is the list of
SFGs from the input that includes the signature sl.
Algorithm 1: One-step-classification function
Input:
assoc a SFG classification list
white a list of trusted SFG
Output: a SFG classification list, one step further
begin
new assocÐ rs ;
forall the g1 P keyspassocq do
forall the g2 P keyspassocq do
v Ð [valuepassoc, g1q] ;
s Ð clean (g1 X g2,white) ;
if s ­“ H
then
forall the g P keyspassocq do
if s is included in g then
v Ð v @value (assoc, g)
new assocÐ addpnew assoc, ps, vqq;
return new assoc;
5 Computing SFG signatures
To evaluate our algorithm, we propose to extract SFG-signatures from the
SFG of 19 malware samples: 5 samples of BadNews [14], 7 samples of Droid-
KungFu1 [7], 3 samples of DroidKungFu2 [15] and 4 samples of jSMSHider [16].
BadNews is a malware of which samples are disguised as legitimate applica-
tions. Based on a manual analysis of these samples, we know that they are clients
of a Command and Control (C&C) server from which they receive commands to
execute. The different commands they can receive are to download and to install
Android applications, to display news notifications (web-page to visit, software
update etc) on the device, to install icons which links to an url or a down-
loaded Android application and to change the address of the C&C server. Dur-
ing the period of our experiment, the C&C server only sent the news command
to advertise two infected-application updates: Doodle Jump and Adobe flash.
DroidKungFu1 and DroidKungFu2 are malware families that attempt to gain
root privileges on the device and stealthily dump malicious applications on the
device when root privileges are gained. Like DroidKungFu families, jSMSHider
also exploits a vulnerability to install applications on the device. According to
Zhou et al. [9], samples of DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2 and jSMSHider are
repacked applications to which a malicious code was added.
Analysis environment To dynamically analyze applications and produce Blare
log, we used a Samsung Nexus S device running the version of Android Ice Cream
Sandwich from the Android Open Source Project. We used a kernel to which
Blare was added. In user-space we added Blare related tools to set tag values, a
standalone version of a toolbox named busybox and an application named Super
User to get notifications when applications use the su command. No additional
applications or components were added or modified.
Application analysis We wanted to observe how an application disseminates
its data within the system. We therefore installed the application and marked
its apk file before its first execution. The apk file contains the resources and the
code of the application when it arrives on the device.
Sample execution and monitoring The malicious code is not always auto-
matically executed when the application is launched. We therefore introduced
events in the system to trigger the malicious behaviour of some malware sam-
ples to shorten the duration of the application analysis. For some samples of
DroidKungFu1 and DroidKungFu2, the associated value of a key named start
in a file named sstimestamp.xml must be set to a small value (e.g 1). For
BadNews, the malicious code is executed once a component of the application
named MainService receives an intent that asks him to start running. In or-
der to launch the application malicious code, the intent must come with an
extra boolean value set to true. We manually craft this intent and send it to
the application during the analysis of the samples of BadNews. In addition to
introducing these key-events, we also use the application as a normal user.
SFG signature computation Once we obtained the logs resulting from the
analysis of 19 samples, we built the corresponding 19 SFGs. We then gave these
SFGs to a program that implements the classification algorithm. The program
returned a classification of 4 groups. 17 out of the 19 samples are exactly classified
as in their origin database. The two remaining are samples of DroidKungFu1 that
were classified as belonging to the same group as the samples of DroidKungFu2.
This is due to the fact that these two samples exhibit the same behaviour as
samples of DroidKungFu2 and also produce the same information flows. This
is thus not an error of our algorithm. The SFG-signatures associated to each
class describe the malicious behaviour of the code introduced in repackaged
applications. We present in figure 1 the signature computed for BadNews. It
describes the download, a part of the installation and execution of two appli-
cations (doodle.jump.apk and adobe.flash.apk). We can see from the figure
that the browser sends data to a server : 213.x.x.x. We intentionally replaced a
part of the IP addresses with the letter x to avoid revealing the original address.
This address correspond to a remote server from which malicious applications
are downloaded.
57460 - downloads.db
577 -  iders.downloads
*
57361 -  data_3 0 -  (82.x.x.x)762 -  id.defcontainer
7958 -  /mnt/asec/smdl2tmp1/pkg.apk
*
1026 -  ackageinstaller
*
15 -  /sdcard/download/adobe.flash.apk
*
80 -  drmserver
*
14 -  /sdcard/download/doodle.jump.apk
*








8237 -  /data/drm/fwdlock/kek.dat
*
**





Fig. 1: SFG signature of BadNews
6 Conclusion
We made a proposition to classify Android malware in this work. First, we pro-
posed to use a data structure named System Flow Graph (SFG) as a profile of
an application. It describes in a compact and human readable way how a partic-
ular execution is responsible of information dissemination within the operating
system and can be constructed from the log of an information flow monitor.
Second, we proposed to use SFGs to characterize malware samples. The main
idea behind the approach is that when applications are infected by the same
piece of malware, it should be possible to exhibit a similar sub-SFG in their
respective SFGs. Following this idea we have proposed a classification algorithm
that regroups SFGs according to the maximal sub-SFG(s) they have in common.
We have applied the proposed algorithm to compute the signature of pieces of
malware discovered during the last two years. Our algorithm has successfully
extracted a signature for each malware family from which we picked samples
for our experiment and each signature only matches the samples of the malware
family to which they belong. In future work, we plan to use these signatures in
a new form of malware detection engine.
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